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ESSAY
Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies
RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL*
What is "Critical Legal Studies," and why are people saying such
terrible things about it? The Wall Street Journal, for example, calls it
a "Marxist/Anarchist movement," which holds that "law is merely a
tool for the rich, and should be toppled forthwith."' A senior official
in the Reagan Justice Department denounces it as "'60s radicalism
turned into '80s legal theory."2 An article in The New Republic labels
the movement's adherents-many of whom are law professors at the
nation's most prestigious law schools-"guerrillas with tenure. '
Voices within legal academia have scarcely been more generous.
One calls the published works of the movement "irresponsib[le]" and
"[g]rotesque." 4 Another suggests that "the Crits" (critical legal theo-
rists) represent "a pathological phenomenon, a Peter Pan syn-
drome." 5 And Dean Paul Carrington of Duke declares that they are
"nihilist[s]," who "have an ethical duty to depart the law school, per-
haps to seek a place elsewhere in the academy."
6
As a dues-paying member of the Conference on Critical Legal
Studies, I confess that I find these statements quite troubling. (Indeed,
as a "guerrilla" without tenure, I find them positively frightening.)
They trouble me because Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") has played
an invaluable role in my own professional life. I "grew up" on CLS.
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. The following is an
expanded version of a presentation given on the "New Developments in Legal Education"
panel at the 1986 Conference of the Southwest Association of Pre-Law Advisors, in Dallas,
Texas. Many thanks to the University of Miami Law Review for agreeing to publish it here; to
Jeremy Paul for his many helpful suggestions; and to other friends too numerous to mention
by name for their thoughtful reactions to an earlier draft. For the title, of course, apologies to
Karl Llewellyn, whose works (in particular, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to
Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931)) still inspire.
This article is dedicated to my colleagues on the Miami faculty, who continue to have the
self-confidence and good sense to chew on ideas, and not the people who hold them.
1. The Veritas About Harvard, Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1986, at 26, col. I (editorial).
2. Eastland, Radicals in the Law Schools, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1986, at 16, col. 4.
3. Menand, Radicalism for Yuppies, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 17, 1986, at 20.
4. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. 413,
414 (1984).
5. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be a Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 248 (1984).
6. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 222, 227 (1984).
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I attended Harvard Law School (the so-called " 'Rome of Critical
Legal Studies' ") in the mid-1970's and studied there with a number
of CLS scholars. And nothing else in my legal education prepared me
as well for the practice and teaching of law as the lessons I learned
(and am still learning) from those scholars and from others in the
CLS movement. The quoted criticisms thus seem to me to represent
what is, at best, a profound misunderstanding of what CLS is all
about; at worst, they are distortions by individuals who should know
better, but who apparently feel tremendously threatened by the
enterprise.
There is, however, a frequent criticism of CLS that contains
more than a grain of truth. Many of the writings associated with the
movement are extremely difficult to read and understand-some of
them, perhaps, needlessly so.' Accordingly, the fair-minded law stu-
dent, lawyer, or law professor who would like to draw her own con-
clusions about CLS faces the formidable task of having to negotiate
some rather challenging terrain. This essay is an attempt to map that
course. I want to try to explain why the detractors might feel
threatened by CLS, but at the same time convince the rest of you that
you shouldn't be. In particular, I want to assure you that it's per-
fectly safe to attend, hire from, be an alumnus of, or teach at a law
school with a prominent CLS presence.9 (Indeed, I think that you
7. Trillin, A Reporter at Large: Harvard Law School, NEW YORKER, Mar. 26, 1984, at
76, col. 3 (quoting Harvard Law School Professor Duncan Kennedy).
8. This criticism can be-and usually is-overstated. See, e.g., Hegland, Goodbye to
Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (1985) (suggesting that most CLS scholars do
not "writ[e] clearly"). Some of the best CLS works are hard to penetrate not because of the
way they are written, but because of the novelty and complexity of the ideas with which they
deal. See, e.g., Woodward, Toward a "Super Liberal State," N.Y. Times Sunday Book Rev.,
Nov. 23, 1986, at 29, col. 2 (reviewing R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT (1986)) ("This book is tough going but not, as one might expect, for reasons of
style. It is written clearly, powerfully and on occasion eloquently. The difficulty is the
content."); see also Hyland, A Defense of Legal Writing, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 599 (1986)
(defending complex conceptual analysis in good legal writing against "the myth of the
universal applicability of the Hemingway style [, which] . . . makes it seem as if the various
levels of language and thought can be telescoped into one").
9. The "usual suspects" in this regard seem to be Harvard, Stanford, U.C.L.A., Rutgers-
Camden, S.U.N.Y. Buffalo, and the Universities of Wisconsin and Miami. See, e.g., Wash.
Times, Sept. 25, 1986, at 5A, col. 4 (listing several law schools where CLS purportedly has a
"sizeable influence"). If the situation here at Miami is any indication, however, the reports of
our ubiquity are exaggerated. I am reminded of the story of the philosopher who offered a
vigorous defense of solipsism in a lecture delivered to a lay audience. Someone approached the
philosopher afterward and exclaimed, "That was a wonderful lecture, Professor! You know, I
think I'm a solipsist, too!" To which the philosopher is said to have replied, "That's funny. I
thought I was the only one."
To be sure, a number of my colleagues are sympathetic with, if often critical of, CLS.
Their receptiveness is at least in part attributable to the strong "Legal Realist" tradition
among the faculty at Miami and the influence of Deans Soia Mentschikoff and Wesley Sturges,
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should have serious reservations about any school that would follow
Dean Carrington's advice and banish us to academic Siberia.)
To that end, I want to give a brief account of the theory of law
associated with CLS and to describe its place in the history of Ameri-
can legal thought. But two major caveats: First, CLS is not a mono-
lith. Over 150 of us' ° identify ourselves with the movement," and I
suspect that there are about that many positions among us on any
given concrete issue. (In this sense, we differ little from any other
intellectual movement in the history of academia, law or otherwise.)
So, what I offer you is not "the CLS perspective," or even the Miami
CLS perspective. It's Fischl on CLS, for what it's worth.
The second caveat is that a complete account of the ideas associ-
ated with CLS would fill volumes; thus, what follows is necessarily a
somewhat oversimplified account. This point should not be taken
lightly. If there is any one premise to which most CLS adherents
subscribe, it is that our contributions to legal thought are revealed less
in the broad pronouncements that some of the more hyperbolic
among us are given to make, than in the "details" of our scholarly
treatments of the rich texture of moral values and ideological assump-
tions reflected in legal doctrine,' 2 our specific prescriptions for legal
education,' 3 and, perhaps most importantly, what goes on each day in
our classrooms. I therefore strongly urge those of you who want to
who were major forces in the Realist movement. See generally W. TWINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973). As I suggest below, CLS owes a
significant intellectual debt to Legal Realism.
10. See, e.g., Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461
(1984) (listing published works by approximately 150 authors).
11. For example, by paying dues, attending the so-called "annual conferences" (though we
didn't have one in 1986), and endlessly citing each others' articles in our scholarly works. See,
e.g., infra notes 12 & 13.
12. The "complete works" as of 1984 are compiled in Kennedy & Klare, supra note 10.
Some of the most accessible, if not necessarily the most representative, among them appear in
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982). For the ambitious,
and particularly for those who want to know whether CLS scholars are capable of offering a
"positive" program, see R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
There is also a growing body of scholarship about CLS. See, e.g., Critical Legal Studies
Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Symposium on Critical Legal Studies, 6 CARDOZO L.
REV. 693 (1985). The authors working in this genre can be divided into roughly three
categories: insiders and friendly critics who are "institutionalizing" CLS by attempting to
describe it as a "movement" (see, e.g., this article), hostile critics who would probably prefer to
institutionalize some of its adherents (see, e.g., Carrington, supra note 6), and insiders trying,
among other things, to fend off the challenges from both directions (see, e.g., Kennedy, Psycho-
Social CLS: A Comment on the Cardozo Symposium, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 1013 (1985)).
13. See, e.g., Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1003 (1985); Jaff,
Frame-Shifting: An Empowering Methodology for Teaching, 36 J. LEGAl. EDUC. 249 (1986);
Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 12, at 40; Paul, A Bedtime Story (Sept. 10, 1986)
(unpublished manuscript).
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come to grips with CLS to read our works and observe our classes,
and not to rely solely upon the brief introduction to its ideas and theo-
ries that I offer here.
I. PROLOGUE: THE LEGAL REALIST CRITIQUE
A. Two Views of Law
Americans, lay people and lawyers alike, seem to hold two con-
tradictory images of the institution we call "law." On the one hand,
we espouse an idealized image of law that begins with the notion of a
set of legal rules enacted by our elected representatives in the form of
either statutes or constitutional provisions. Now we may be some-
what cynical about the processes by which we select the representa-
tives to perform this task; witness the widely shared and no doubt
largely correct assumption that only a candidate with massive finan-
cial resources or the "right connections" has a good chance of being
elected to public office. And we may be equally dubious about the
law-enactment process. We may, with good reason, believe that leg-
islatures are more responsive to horse-trading by powerful economic
interests than they are to the interests of the electorate at large. That,
as we say, is just "politics."14
Yet our idealized image of the law has a heroine who comes rid-
ing to the rescue: the judge. Horse-trading and the pork-barrel have
no place in her domain. According to the idealized image, good judg-
ing consists of the rote, almost robot-like application of legal rules to
the facts of individual cases. There is no room fo ".e judge's personal
preferences in the performance of this role. Central to this image,
then, is the premise that a meaningful distinction exists between what
a legislature does when it makes the laws, and what a judge does when
she applies them-that is, a sharp distinction between what we call
"politics" and what we call "law." (I take it that this is a major part
of what we mean when we say that ours is ultimately "a government
of laws and not men.") I5
14. For a sophisticated and persuasive account of the political economy of recent elections
and legislative developments on the national level that goes a long way toward vindicating
these intuitions, see T. FERGUSON & J. ROGERS, RIGHT TURN: THE DECLINE OF THE
DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1986).
15. The sources of the quote are traced in Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. RzV. 4, 4 n.2 (1986). Problematic for this idealized image is the
existence of a third source of rules, beyond statutory and constitutional law: the common law
of contracts, torts, and property, which was "made," originally in any event, by judges. But
the idealized image represses the fact of this decidedly non-mechanical judicial enterprise by
viewing the common law as a more-or-less "natural" set of rules that have been with us time
out of mind, and by confining the modern judge to the straightforward application of those
rules through the principle of stare decisis. See generally Paul, Searchigbr the Status Quo
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At the same time, we hold a second view of law, a skeptic's view.
We often frankly recognize the judicial process as overtly political and
highly discretionary. Recent events remind us, for example, of the
significance we attribute to the ideology of those who get appointed to
the nation's courts, irrespective of the appointees' asserted "craft" and
professional skills. And we all suspect that there is a large measure of
truth in the punch line to the old joke about the lawyer who, when
asked, "What is two plus two?", responds: "What do you want it to
be?"
This skeptical perspective is often accompanied by the sincere
belief that the idealized image of judging-as more-ori-less rote law-
application-would work, if only judges did their job right. But there
is also a nagging sense that there is something inherent in the enter-
prise that dooms even the conscientious judge to failure. Recall, for
example, the scene early in the movie Paper Chase, when the very
traditional Professor Kingsfield warns his students, "For every
answer you give, I will pose another question-always another ques-
tion." First-year law students soon learn (as does anyone who con-
sults a good lawyer) the painful lesson that there is always a
counterargument, always a countervailing consideration, always "the
other side"-at least in any case that matters. They learn, in short,
that there is seldom a "sure bet" in the realm of legal discourse, and
that when a judge "finds" that one set of arguments trump another in
a given case, there is reason to suspect that there is more going on
than the mere mechanical "application" of legal rules to the facts.
This conflict is not merely academic. A society's image of the
nature of law will have a profound impact upon its understanding of
the legitimate institutional role that judges should play within the
political system. A society that holds what I have called the idealized
image of law, for example, would have no difficulty squaring judicial
power with a professed commitment to representative democracy. In
such a society, the role of the judge would be understood as simply to
carry out faithfully the laws enacted by the people's representatives in
the legislature. Conversely, a society holding the skeptic's view would
be hard-pressed to reconcile with its democratic aspirations the
judge's license to impose her own discretionary choices on the
citizenry.
It is not surprising, then, to find that if Americans are ambivalent
about law, we are downright schizophrenic about our view of the
(Book Review), 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 743 (1986) (reviewing R. EPsrI-IN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)).
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appropriate institutional role for our judges. Note that for the better
part of two centuries, we have regularly called upon the judiciary to
answer the most intractable questions we have faced, from the lawful-
ness of slavery' 6 to the constitutionality of state anti-abortion legisla-
tion. 17 Yet at the same time, politicians, presidents, attorneys general,
and even law professors routinely express grave doubts about the
legitimacy of this inveterate practice, and outrage when the courts
render decisions that thereby "substitute their judgment for the will of
the people."
How did we get to this ambivalent state of affairs? How did we
reach a point where we seem to believe both that law is mechanical
and rule-bound, on the one hand, and that it is political and highly
discretionary, on the other? Where we entrust many of our most
deeply divisive questions to judges, but routinely condemn them for
giving us the answers?'" Like the poor, these conflicts may have
always been with us. But a better understanding of what's at stake
may be achieved by examining the current predicament against the
broader scheme of the history of modern American legal thought.
B. Scientific Jurisprudence vs. Legal Realism
Our conflicted understanding of law may reflect an earlier battle
about its nature, a battle between "Scientific Jurisprudence" and
"Legal Realism" that first took place some sixty years ago. Scientific
Jurisprudence, a 19th century development, was just what the name
suggests.' 9 It was a theory that viewed legal reasoning-that is, the
16. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
This practice may reflect a third view of law: a Romantic view that is, in a sense, the
flipside of the "skeptic's" view. Thus, there seem to be occasions when we actually want judges
to transcend the robot-like law-applier's role and to save us from what we suppose to be our
(or, more often, someone else's) democratic excesses. For an insightful argument along these
lines, see Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and the Democratic Practice of Judicial Review, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 679 (1986).
18. This latter phenomenon has always called to my mind the scene in Casablanca when
Louie, the French police official played by Claude Raines, silences the din in Rick's Cafe to
announce that he is ordering the place shut. "On what grounds?" objects Humphrey Bogart's
Rick. "I'm shocked," replies Louie, indignantly, "shocked to find gambling going on in the
backroom of this establishment." At which moment Rick's croupier enters from the
backroom, hands Louie a large wad of bills, and says, "Your winnings, sir." The scene ends
with Louie somewhat sheepishly tucking the booty into his pocket.
19. Although "formalism" is often used as a synonym for Scientific Jurisprudence. see.
e.g., M. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 253-66 (1977),
i have avoided that term here because its current usage suggests an approach to legal reasoning
that transcends any particular historical period. See. e.g., R. UNGER, supra note 12, at 10;
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HAMv. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
Moreover, the term "scientific" captures the roots and aspirations of the jurisprudence that I
[Vol. 41:505
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analysis that a judge or a lawyer undertakes in "applying" the law to
the facts of a particular case-as a species of "science." It was, most
of all, a claim that this characteristic sharply distinguished law-
application from what a legislature did when it was making law.
Thus, where law-making was understood as an act of will, a mat-
ter of the subjective choice of the legislators, law-application was
thought to be precise, logical, and, like all scientific undertakings, sus-
ceptible to objective verification. Concrete results in specific cases
were thought to be syllogistically "required" by the law-whether the
authoritative source was the common law, legislative enactment, or
the Constitution. Thus, professionals trained in the legal method
could confidently describe judicial decisions as "right" (that is, cor-
rect as a matter of legal analysis) or "wrong. '"20
Where did this jurisprudence come from?2 1 There is persuasive
evidence for several interrelated "causes": sociological (the rise of a
professional self-image among lawyers and a concomitant need to
distinguish their analytical endeavors from mere "laymen's reason-
ing" 22), intellectual (the "scientification" of many intellectual disci-
plines during this period 3 ), and political (the contemporaneous
efforts to justify controversial judicial decisions by casting them in
terms of a neutral legal science24), among others. Whatever its roots,
Scientific Jurisprudence is no doubt closely connected, historically
and conceptually, with the idealized image of law that I described at
the outset. By appearing to show that there was a single, correct
answer to every legal question, and that a competent judge could
want to describe more directly than the term "formalism." See infra notes 21-24 and
accompanying text.
20. For more nuanced presentations of this jurisprudence, see, for example, M. HORWITZ,
supra note 19, at 253-66; P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CiViL WAR 99-265 (1965); Kennedy, Toward an Historical
Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-
1940, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 3, 9-14 (1980); White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999,
1000-02 (1972); see also G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 12-34 (1974).
21. Scientific Jurisprudence was itself a rejection of the earlier 18th century view that law
was God-given or "natural." On this historical transformation, see M. HORWITZ, supra note
19.
22. See id. at 257; P. MILLER, supra note 20, at 99-265. This development was of a piece
with the emergence of the modern law school, and the effort by legal academics to justify its
place in the university setting. See e.g., G. GILMORE, supra note 20, at 12.
23. See P. MILLER, supra note 20, at 99-265. It should perhaps be noted here that the
view of "science" underlying this jurisprudence was itself a product of uniquely 19th century
conceptions. See White, supra note 20, at 1001; see generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENrHlic REVOUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
24. See M. HORWITZ, supra note 19, at 253-66; see also infra notes 26-28 and
accompanying text.
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always "find" that answer, it provided a comforting solution to the
problem of squaring judicial power with democratic ideals.
Someone once said that "[iut takes a theory to beat a theory,"25
but often a theory's own adherents can do the job faster. The classic
example of this phenomenon is the turn-of-the-century Supreme
Court, busy as it was striking down all manner of popular state and
federal social legislation, from minimum wage and maximum hours
laws to child labor statutes, as interfering with the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 26 The Justices involved may well have
believed that they were simply "applying" that constitutional provi-
sion to the cases at hand.27 But by the early part of the 20th century,
there was a growing sense, particularly among progressives and liber-
als in legal academia and elsewhere, that such decisions were any-
thing but "scientific," let alone consistent with democratic ideals.
Challenges thus arose on several fronts.28
Most relevant to my purposes here was the challenge mounted by
Karl Llewellyn and the Legal Realists in the 1920's and 30's.29 The
Realists had no quarrel with the earlier movement's scientific aspira-
tions; indeed, on one level, they simply claimed to do science better.3°
25. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Rejoinder to Professors Getman and
Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435, 1435 (1983).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The classic case is, of course, Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905). For a thoughtful rendering of this oft'-told story, see A. PAUL,
CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-
1895 (1960).
27. See Kennedy, supra note 20, at 9-14.
28. For an eloquent and more complete account of the responses to Scientific
Jurisprudence and their connection to the Progressive and New Deal political movements, see
White, supra note 20; see also P. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972).
29. See W. TWINING, supra note 9. This is the appropriate time for a caveat much like the
one stated earlier about CLS: Legal Realism was not a monolith either. (Nor, for that matter,
was Scientific Jurisprudence.) See, e.g., Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding
to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1233-34 (1931) ("One thing is clear. There is no
school of realists. There is no likelihood that there will be such a school. There is no group
with an official or accepted, or even with an emerging creed.").
Thus, I realize that I am painting here with a broad brush. Nonetheless, even Llewellyn
agreed that it is meaningful to discuss Realism as a "movement," at least in terms of its general
tendencies and, particularly, its "method of attack." Id. at 1234. Indeed, in Some Realism
About Realism, Llewellyn attempted to do just that. See White, supra note 20, at 1017
(arguing that Llewellyn and Jerome Frank "may be considered the primary exponents of
Realism not because their views were the most representative of the movement (most of the
individuals who considered themselves Realists were disinclined to allow their colleagues'
views to represent their own), but because they were the most anxious of their peers to see
themselves as members of a jurisprudential 'school,' to attempt to state its canons, and to
criticize other schools").
30. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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But the Realists contended that the judicial method embraced by Sci-
entific Jurisprudence was "legal magic and word-jugglery.'3' In an
explicit rejection of that approach, the Realists argued that law is
indeterminate-that is, that what we call legal reasoning can rarely be
said to require, in any objective sense, a particular result in a given
case.
This claim-its fancy name is "the indeterminacy argument"-
finds powerful reflection in what I described earlier as the second,
"skeptical" view of law that we hold today. It is also a central tenet
of Critical Legal Studies.3 2 Indeed, I will argue below that much of
the contemporaneous attack on CLS is motivated by the movement's
vigorous embrace of the "indeterminacy argument." Accordingly,
the nature of that argument is worth a long digression for close
examination.
C. The Indeterminacy Argument: The Emperor Unclothed
1. THE ARGUMENT INTRODUCED
The indeterminacy argument is a claim about our traditions of
legal discourse-a claim, to put it crudely, that for virtually every
"rule" there is a counter-rule, an exception, or some other lawyerly
gambit available to put the legal question at issue in equipoise. 33 It
would be impossible to undertake anything like a satisfactory demon-
stration of this point here, but three examples may at least be sugges-
tive. First, consider the so-called "canons of construction," the
guidelines available to judges to assist them in their interpretation of
statutes.34 A famous one states that "statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed. ' 35  Under this canon, a
judge is supposed to hew as closely as possible to the literal command
31. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 821 (1935).
32. Thoughtful and accessible accounts of the historical connection between Legal
Realism and CLS are set forth in White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies. A Truncated
Intellectual History, 40 Sw. L.J. 819 (1986), and Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush:
From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1982). For a
particularly insightful account of this connection, rendered before CLS even existed, see
Casebeer, Escape From Liberalism: Fact and Value in Karl Llewellyn, 1977 DUKE L.J. 671.
33. See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 29, at 1239 (arguing that the Realists had "come close
to demonstrating that in any case doubtful enough to make litigation respectable[,] the
available authoritative premises-i.e., premises legitimate and impeccable under the traditional
legal techniques-are at least two, and . . . the two are mutually contradictory as applied to
the case in hand").
34. See, e.g., K. Li.EWEII.YN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECI)ING APP.AI.S
521-35 (1960).
35. Eg.. American Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Em-Kay Engineering Co.. 478 F. Supp. 809, 814
(E.D. Cal. 1979).
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of the legislature when she is interpreting a statute that is "in deroga-
tion of the common law." At the same time, a second canon declares
that "remedial" statutes "must be liberally construed."36 This means
that a judge interpreting a "remedial" statute should read it
broadly-beyond the precise wording, if that's what it takes-in order
to effectuate the legislature's public purpose.
Let's take a look at how these canons work. Consider the com-
mon law "employment-at-will" rule. In the absence of an express
contractual agreement to the contrary, an employer enjoys the pre-
sumptive right to discharge an employee without notice "for good
cause or for bad cause, or even for no cause."37 Assume that the legis-
lature enacts a statute that prohibits employers from "discharging or
otherwise retaliating against any employee because of such employee's
refusal to engage in any conduct unlawful under the laws of the
State." Assume further that the statute provides a private right of
action for affected employees, enabling them to secure reinstatement
and backpay. Then consider the case of a trucking company that fires
an employee for reporting to the authorities the employer's persistent
violation of various provisions of the state's highway safety and motor
vehicle code. The employee sues for relief, and the employer defends,
contending that he has not engaged in conduct prohibited by the
employment statute.
What should the judge do when she is presented with this contro-
versy? Recall our "canons of construction." Arguably, the statute in
question "derogates" the employer's common law right to discharge
an employee "for good cause or for bad cause, or even for no cause."
According to the first canon, therefore, the statute should be
"strictly" construed. Operating on that premise, the judge might rea-
son that the legislature said only that an employer couldn't dismiss an
36. E.g., United States v. One Hazardous Product Consisting of a Refuse Bin, 487 F.
Supp. 581, 588 (D.N.J. 1980).
37. Payne v. Western & Atd. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884), overruled on other grounds.
Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 544 (1915). Even if an employee succeeds in extracting a
promise of employment for a specific duration from her employer, various common law
devices-unique to the employment contract context-may render such a promise
unenforceable. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1818-20 (1980); see also 1 S.
Wii.ISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 39 (1924); IA CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 152, at 13-17 (1963).
On the wisdom and effect of recent judicial and legislative inroads into the employment-
at-will rule, compare Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will. 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947
(1984) with Finkin, "In Defense of the Contract At Will"-Some Discussion Comments and
Questions, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 727 (1985) and Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against
Wrongfid Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. Riiv. 1931 (1983) [hereinafter
Note, Public Policy]. See generally Casebeer, Teaching an Old Dog Old Tricks: Coppage v.
Kansas and At-Will Employment Revisited, 6 CARDozo L. REV. 765 (1985).
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employee who refused to engage in unlawful conduct; the legislature
said nothing at all about limiting the employer's right to fire an
employee for reporting such conduct. Accordingly, the judge might
reasonably reject the employee's argument that the judiciary should
expand the limitation on the employer's common law right that is
imposed by the statute.
But arguably, the statute is also "remedial" in nature; that is, the
legislature enacted it to achieve the remedial purpose of preventing
employers from using the at-will-employment rule to circumvent the
laws of the state. According to the second canon, then, the statute
should be "liberally" construed. Operating on that premise, the judge
might conclude that this remedial purpose is thwarted every bit as
much by permitting the discharge of a "whistleblower," as it is by
permitting the discharge of an employee who refuses to engage in
unlawful conduct. Accordingly, she might reasonably accept the
employee's argument that the statute should be construed to cover her
case.
The point, of course, is that either canon of construction argua-
bly applies to the situation at hand-indeed, as you have no doubt
figured out, "remedial statutes" are, by their very nature, "statutes in
derogation of the common law." But the two canons point in pre-
cisely opposite directions! Neither canon is "right"; lawyers use ver-
sions of each all of the time.38 As a leading Realist put it, a statute
"can be extended pretty widely and contracted pretty narrowly. And
if you are a little clever, it will catch or let out the situation you are
deciding."39 Thus, the Realists argued, legal rules that judges tradi-
tionally use to justify their decisions do not--cannot-yield a single
"correct" answer to the questions put.
38. Compare 30 NINTH DECENNIAL DIGEST pt. 1, Statutes 239 (1976-81) ("Statutes in
derogation of common law or common right") (collecting cases) with id. § 236 ("Remedial
statutes") (collecting cases). Dean Mentschikoff first brought the conflict between these
particular canons to my attention during an unforgettable lecture she gave to the newly-hired
faculty at Miami in the fall of 1983. Other examples of this phenomenon will no doubt readily
occur to perceptive observers of the judicial scene. Compare "[T]here is no need to refer to the
legislative history where the statutory language is clear" with "But words are inexact tools at
best, and for that reason there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory
legislative history no matter how clear the words may appear on superficial examination"; and
compare -[I]f extreme hardship will result from a literal application of the words, this may be
taken as evidence that the legislature did not use them literally" with "It is not enough merely
that hard and objectionable or absurd consequences, which probably were not within the
contemplation of the framers, are produced by an act of legislation." K. LLEWELLYN, supra
note 34, at 529, 530; see also S. MENTSCHIKOFF & I. STOTZKY, THE THEORY AND CRAFT OF
AMERICAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 46-47 (1981).
39. Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decisions: or How Judges Think, II A.B.A. J. 357, 361
(1925).
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2. THE APOLITICS OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
Note that the "liberal" construction of the statute in my first
example supports relief for the discharged "whistleblower" and is
thus also "liberal" in the sense we usually mean it in our political
discourse. But that is simply happenstance. Giving a statute a "lib-
eral" construction means giving it a broad reading in order to effectu-
ate the underlying legislative purpose. Thus, the effect of a liberal
construction depends in large part upon whether that purpose is itself
"liberal" or "conservative. ' 40 The point is that there is nothing neces-
sarily "liberal" or "conservative" about any of the legal arguments in
the lawyer's arsenal; argumentative gambits used one day to achieve
one set of results, politics-wise, can often be flipped the next to
achieve the opposite. My second and third examples should help bear
this out.
There is a recurring debate in American contracts cases about
whether a court, in determining the meaning of an agreement between
two private parties, should confine its inquiry to what the parties actu-
ally said (or wrote), or rather should explore more broadly all of the
circumstances surrounding a transaction-for example, the parties'
prior course of dealing, their actions after the agreement was reached,
and any customs of their trade-to divine the parties' reasonable
understanding of their deal.4 '
To make this conflict concrete, take the facts of Hurley v.
Eddingfield,42 the case I start with in my first-year Contracts course.
An individual living in turn-of-the-century rural Indiana suddenly
became seriously ill, and summoned his family doctor to his aid.
"[W]ithout any reason whatever, '4 3 the doctor refused to go, and the
patient died. I ask whether the doctor breached a contract with the
patient, and the class typically splits right down the middle on the
question."
40. For a liberal construction of a "conservative" law, see, for example, Preterm, Inc. v.
Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 127-34 (1st Cir. 1979) (liberal construction of Hyde Amendment
prohibiting expenditure of federal funds for certain medically necessary abortions); see also
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306-11 (1980) (reaching same result on other grounds).
41. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, supra note 20, at 35-53.
42. 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901).
43. Id.
44. Hurley itself did not address this issue. Rather, the patient's estate sued the doctor in
tort, claiming that the doctor had wrongfully caused the patient's death by "refus[ing] to enter
into a contract of employment" with him. Id. at 417, 59 N.E. at 1058 (emphasis added).
Thus, counsel for the estate apparently believed that the doctor and patient were not already
parties to a contract. Perhaps counsel's view that an "employment" contract was at stake
influenced his theory of the case; such contracts were terminable at will under contemporary
doctrine, see supra note 37 and accompanying text, and thus no remedy was available for their
unilateral "breach."
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Many students point out that, so far as the facts stated in the
opinion reveal, the doctor never specifically promised the patient that
he would come to the latter's aid. Accordingly, they conclude, there
can be no contract between the parties. Others seize upon the fact that
the doctor was the patient's "family physician.""a They argue that,
given the common understanding of the rights and responsibilities
that such a relationship entails, and particularly in light of the prob-
able scarcity of medical care eighty years ago in rural Indiana, the
patient would have reasonably understood the doctor's "promise" to
attend to him in emergency situations as being implicit in their
relationship.
What follows is a healthy debate about the merits of one
approach to fact analysis versus the other. Those who support the
doctor's position argue, among other things, that it is dangerous to
permit the courts to determine that an individual has consented to a
contractual obligation where that individual has not done so
expressly. Those who support the patient, on the other hand, are con-
vinced that such a restrictive view of the facts ignores the significance
of context in human communication and will thus frustrate the par-
ties' real understanding and expectations.
By the end of their debate, both sides seem convinced that their
respective arguments about the proper approach to fact analysis and
their respective, instincts about the degree of responsibility that the
law should require from the doctor to the patient somehow "connect
up." That is, the students have an intuition that the "conservative"
position, which insists on the doctor's absolute right to choose not to
come to the aid of the patient, is supported by an equally "conserva-
tive" argument about courts' sticking to what the parties have actu-
ally said and not casting about for what they might have meant; and
they have the corresponding intuition that the "liberal" position,
which insists on the doctor's duty to aid the patient, is supported by
the equally "liberal" argument about the importance of context to
understanding human relationships.46 However I try to persuade
them that they both have valid points, each side is ready to conclude
45. 156 Ind. at 416, 59 N.E. at 1058 (emphasis added).
46. As usual, the students' instincts are on to something. As Duncan Kennedy
demonstrated in his seminal piece, at least within the law of contracts, the forms of legal
argument and the substantive legal regimes they tend to promote do seem to match up. See
Kennedy, supra note 19 (discussing the connection between "formalism" in legal argument
and "individualism" as a social ideal, and the connection between "antiformalism" and
"altruism"); see also Jaff, supra note 13, at 263-67 (discussing connection between context-
sensitive analysis and an ethic of interpersonal responsibility). But see infra note 48.
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that its approach to fact analysis is just "good lawyering," and that
the other's is inherently defective.
But an amazing thing happens during the second semester, when
the students take their course in criminal procedure. Early in that
course, they study the following problem: The police confront a citi-
zen and ask whether they can search his person or home, in spite of
the fact that they have no warrant authorizing them to do so.
Although the citizen has a constitutional right to decline, the police
may effect such a search if the citizen "voluntarily" gives his consent.
Naturally, there is great difficulty in determining whether consent is
really voluntary-that is, in determining whether the citizen complied
with the request because he thought he must, or whether he knew of
his right to decline and gave his consent anyway. The same debate
the students undertook in the doctor/patient example ensues, but sud-
denly, the "liberals" find themselves vigorously defending what we
previously characterized as the "conservative" argument (the police
must prove that the citizen explicitly and knowingly consented to the
search)-and the "conservatives," the "liberal" one (the voluntariness
of the citizen's consent may legitimately be determined from the
broader context of the challenged search)."
In sum, the students begin to learn the important lesson that
most legal arguments are not inherently "conservative" or "liberal";
they are merely the rhetorical tools available to the lawyer to urge a
particular result in a particular case.48 Sometimes the lawyer will
47. See. e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
48. To be sure, there is a consistent substantive thread that runs through the respective
legal arguments in the two examples. Thus, the argument that insists on express consent may
reflect a resistance to the coercive power of the state, whether exercised to compel a citizen to
"keep her promises" or to open her home to the police. Conversely, the argument that
embraces contextual analysis may be more receptive to the exercise of such power. When
viewed as a debate between "libertarian" and "statist" positions, then, each of the respective
arguments does seem to have a consistent "political" bias. See Kennedy, supra note 19; Jaff,
supra note 13. (The modern American "liberal" and "conservative" positions may simply
reflect the fact that conservatives are relatively more likely to express libertarian views when
the target of state power is, say, a doctor; the liberals, when the target is a criminal defendant.)
But even this bias becomes problematic when we move to a third legal context in which
the issue of "consent" plays a major role: rape. Take the situation in which the victim's
protests are equivocal and her consent is arguably inferable from the context (for example, the
victim has had intercourse with the perpetrator on previous occasions and, at the time in
question, has invited the perpetrator into her apartment for a drink). If the victim's express
consent is required, then the perpetrator may nonetheless be guilty of rape; if, on the other
hand, the victim's consent can be inferred from the context, then the perpetrator may be
innocent. Thus, contrary to his position with respect to the earlier hypotheticals, the
libertarian's resistance to the coercive power of the state might well lead him to favor the
broader contextual approach in the the rape context. (To be sure, however, the matter is far
from clear. It all depends on whose autonomy the libertarian prefers to protect: the
perpetrator's from the state, or the victim's from the perpetrator. See generally Singer, The
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need to argue for a requirement of "express" consent, sometimes for a
more "contextual" analysis of the parties' dealings; just as, in my ear-
lier example, sometimes she will need to argue for a "strict" or "nar-
row" construction of a statute, sometimes for the effectuation of the
underlying legislative purpose. But again, neither argument is "bet-
ter" or "more lawyerly"; other things being the same, they can each
almost invariably claim equal legitimacy in the realm of legal
discourse.
3. MORE SCIENCE
The indeterminacy argument creates a major difficulty for the
judge-and, indeed, for the prospect of justifying the exercise of judi-
cial power in a democratic society. If legal cases may be plausibly
argued "either way" on the basis of the legal rules, then how is the
judge to choose between the competing claims of the parties? How
does she determine whether the whistleblower should be reinstated
despite the employment-at-will rule? Whether the physician must
come to the aid of the dying patient? Whether the police may consti-
tutionally search the citizen? Typically, when she delivers her opin-
ion in a case, she will invoke one or the other of the legal arguments
with which she is presented to justify her result. But if neither argu-
ment actually compels that result, how should the conscientious judge
decide the case?
The Realists embraced the view that legal questions are inevita-
bly "social policy" questions, even if the judges and lawyers involved
are utterly unaware of that fact. Left to their own devices, judges
would invariably decide those questions on the basis of their own
Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV.
975.)
The point is that the respective "biases" of the legal arguments involved depend upon the
nature of the background legal regime rather than upon anything inherent in the arguments
themselves. In the physician/patient and search-and-seizure hypotheticals, the background
regime protects the defendants' autonomy in the absence of their consent. Conversely, in the
rape case, the background regime constrains the defendant/perpetrator unless his victim has
given consent. (The same is true in the context of a consent defense to an intentional tort like
battery.) Because a requirement of express consent would negate a finding of consent in these
contexts, it tends to protect the defendant's autonomy in the physician/patient and search-
and-seizure examples, but may have the opposite effect in the rape case.
Indeed, even within a single background legal regime, the "political" tendencies of these
respective arguments may vary widely. For example, in the doctor/patient contract
hypothetical, a requirement of express consent is consent-negating, while contextual analysis is
consent-affirming. But when applied to certain contract defenses, the arguments may "flip."
Thus, a requirement of express consent may be consent-affirming ("she signed the contract"),
while contextual analysis may be consent-negating ("but its terms were hidden in a maze of
fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices"). See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (defense of unconscionability).
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unstated (and often subconscious) psychological, sociological, and
economic assumptions, 49 and then rationalize their decisions by
invoking legal rules and principles.5 0 Accordingly, the Realists con-
cluded that judges should consciously and frankly engage in sophisti-
cated and fact-sensitive social science analysis so that they could
make better policy.
To overstate the matter somewhat, the Realists sought to substi-
tute one form of science for another. They dismissed the analytic sci-
ence of Scientific Jurisprudence, with its focus on the abstract logical
reasoning of judges, but would have put in its place an empirical sci-
ence of the human relationships and institutions whose disputes
judges were supposed to resolve." The further the judge could delve
into the details of our daily endeavors, the more likely she would be to
develop the "situation sense" necessary to reach the proper "policy"
solution to the dispute presented. As Llewellyn explained in a famous
passage in The Common Law Tradition:
Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can
take it in, carries within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its
right law. This is a natural law which ... is not a creature of mere
reason, but rests on the solid foundation of what reason can recog-
nize in the nature of man and of the life conditions of the time and
place; it is thus ... indwelling in the very circumstances of life.
The highest task of law-giving consists in uncovering and imple-
menting this immanent law. 5
2
49. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 31, at 834. Arguing that " '[s]ocial policy'" was the
"gravitational field that gives weight to any rule or precedent," Cohen sounded the call for a
"legal science" that would undertake to examine:
the psychological doctrines embedded in our rules of evidence, the sociological
theories assumed in our criminal law, the economic assumptions embalmed in
our doctrines of constitutional law, and the psychological, sociological, and
economicfacts which gave force and significance to rules and decisions in these
and other fields of law.
Id.
50. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 130 (1936) ("What then is the
part played by legal rules and principles? . . . [O]ne of their chief uses is to enable judges to
give formal justifications-rationalizations--of the conclusions at which they otherwise arrive.
From that point of view these formulas are devices for concealing rather than disclosing what
the law is." (footnote omitted)).
51. For a more sophisticated analysis of the Realists' views in this connection, see White,
supra note 20, at 1013-21.
52. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 122 (quoting L. Goldschmidt, Preface to Kritik des
Entwurfs eines Handelsgesetzbuchs, Krit. Zeitschr. f.d. ges. Rechtswissenschaft, Vol. 4, No.
4); see also J. FRANK, supra note 50, at 146-47:
It has been argued that judges will go far towards abandoning "medievalism"
when they begin to procure, and to rely on, carefully prepared factual data as to
the social setting of the cases which come before them for decision .... [T]here
deserves to be studied the possible employment, throughout the field of law, of
[the] . . . patient investigation, by disinterested experts, of the facts and
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Born of the progressive politics of the New Deal era, then, Real-
ism undertook its rule-debunking program in the service of exposing
the law for what it really was: social policymaking. But the Realists
did not intend to leave the Emperor naked. The law's "ought" could
be found in the real-world's "is," discovered by a fact-sensitive adjudi-
cation overtly and consciously informed by the methods of social
science.
D. Reaction: The Emperor Strikes Back
The response to the Realist critique was swift and severe. Legal
academia and the establishment bar were, understandably, extremely
threatened by a school of thought that assertedly viewed judging as
"mere" policy-making, rather than the analytic reasoning that Scien-
tific Jurisprudence had envisioned. The resulting attacks on the Real-
ists, and on Llewellyn in particular, were vociferous; indeed, some of
them recall the characterizations of Critical Legal Studies that I
quoted at the outset.5 3 In Llewellyn's own words:
I was shown to disbelieve in rules, to deny them and their existence
and desirability, to approve and exalt brute force and arbitrary
power and unfettered tyranny, to disbelieve in ideals and particu-
larly in justice.54
Thoroughgoing accounts of the long-term effects of and
responses to Realism have been eloquently rendered elsewhere;55 I
want to make only two brief points here. The first concerns the Real-
ists' legacy in "mainstream" legal thought-that is, its continuing
background of individual cases . . . . But the systematic, deliberate and openly
disclosed use of the unique facts of a case will not be of much service until the
judges develop the notion of law as a portion of the science of human nature.
For works offering perceptive discussions of Llewellyn's "situation sense," see W. TWINING,
supra note 9, at 216-27; Casebeer, supra note 32, at 673-76; Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and
Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 698-708 (1984).
53. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. One critic, for example, argued that the
Realist controversy was no less than a contest between "the force and validity of principles,
precedents, reason, free will, and impartial justice on the one hand, and the impact of emotion,
irrationalism, bias, environment, and juristic skepticism in the legal order." Kennedy, My
Philosophy ofLaw, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS
147, 157 (Julius Rosenthal Foundation 1941); see also White, The Evolution of Reasoned
Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 283 n. 14 (1973)
("[in its most extreme form the attack on Realism came close to equating it with treason").
For some of the more responsible challenges to Realism, see W. TWINING, supra note 9,
at 379-82.
54. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH xi (1950).
55. See W. TWINING, supra note 9, at 375-87; White, supra note 32, at 825-36; White,
supra note 53, at 282-91.
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impact on day-to-day law practice and teaching. The second con-
cerns the Realists' continuing influence on modern legal theory.
The principal legacy of Legal Realism for mainstream legal
thought is the introduction of "social policy" analysis as an accepta-
ble and indeed indispensible element of sophisticated legal reasoning
and argument 56-albeit in a form that bears precious little resem-
blance to the far subtler version that the Realists seemed to have had
in mind.57 It will come as no surprise to any lawyer (let alone to any
social scientist) that "policy" analysis as we practice it today turns out
to be every bit as indeterminate as the legal rules it would supple-
ment-a fact that no amount of "balancing" or "weighing" of policies
can hide. Indeed, while good lawyers, judges, and law professors now
routinely offer "policy" arguments to support virtually every legal
claim they make, the standard counterarguments are familiar enough
in most areas of the law to be virtually habitual. Thus, for example,
there is seldom a labor case in which one side cannot invoke the goal
of "preserving industrial peace," and the other "promoting workplace
democracy"; there is seldom a patent case in which the policies of
"providing incentives for innovation" and of "promoting competi-
tion" are not in conflict. And virtually everywhere we hear the recur-
ring claims of "the need for flexibility and fairness," on the one hand,
and "the need for certainty and predictability," on the other. 8
Much of what we do is thus reduced to something of a shell
game, albeit a sophisticated and complicated one. One shell is the
mass of legal rules; the other is our arsenal of "social policy" claims.
And while the two provide a rich rhetoric for legal decisions, they do
not "decide cases" any better together than they do apart. Thus, the
pea-the search for a ratio decidendi that really works-is shuffled
back and forth, sometimes under one shell, sometimes the other, but
never in one place long enough to expose either for the hollow recep-
tacle that it is.59
The second claim is that the Realist critique has served as the
starting point for most serious legal theory in the latter half of this
56. This contribution can be traced as well to the efforts of scholars and lawyers associated
with Sociological Jurisprudence, a school of thought that bridged the gap between the
Scientific Jurisprudence of the late 19th Century and Legal Realism in the 1920's and 1930's.
See White, supra note 20, at 1000-12.
57. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 19, at 1710-13.
59. The metaphor was inspired by my now dim recollection of Roberto Unger's opening
lecture in Jurisprudence at Harvard Law School, Spring Term 1978.
[Vol. 41:505
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
century.6" The argument that legal rules cannot, of themselves,
decide cases has received almost universal acceptance. But so has the
belief that there is still something special about the nature of legal
reasoning, something that infuses it with some measure of "neutral-
ity" and "objectivity" and accordingly distinguishes it from the sub-
jective vagaries of "politics" and "ideology."61 Thus, jurisprudential
schools have come and gone, each offering its own solution to the
problem of indeterminacy,62 each preaching mostly to the converted
and getting beaten up by pretty much everyone else.63 As a result,
most legal theorists-outside of CLS, anyway-firmly believe that
law is different from "politics," but vigorously disagree as to any plau-
sible basis for that belief.
We have thus returned to our starting point. We do simultane-
ously hold two radically conflicting views of law-the idealized image
of law as neutral and objective, and the skeptic's image of law as polit-
ical and highly discretionary.6 4 For, on the one hand, "we are all real-
ists now" 6 -- everyone "knows" that legal rules do not decide cases.
But we are able to persist in our commitment to the idealized image
because the fact of indeterminacy is hidden by a style of argument
that oscillates between doctrine and policy and thus obscures the
emptiness of each. Meanwhile, we cling to the faith that legal reason-
ing is more than "just politics" and hope that someday someone will
show us convincingly just how that might be so.
60. See sources cited supra note 55.
61. See R. UNGER, supra note 12, at 1-4.
62. Scholars of the Law and Economics school, for example, accept the Realists' notion of
judicial "policy" analysis, but attempt to give that notion determinate content by embracing
the policy goal of promoting and protecting "efficient" private markets. See, e.g., R. POSNER,
THE ECONOMICS OF LAW (3rd ed. 1986). Liberal rights theorists, by contrast, reject "policy"
analysis altogether, in favor of the judicial articulation of moral "principles." See, e.g., R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
63. See, e.g., Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980);
A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811 (1980); Change in the
Common Law: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1980). It may be that
the Law and Economics and the rights theories, see supra note 62, share a common
characteristic that leaves their respective solutions to the indeterminacy problem particularly
vulnerable (and tempting) to attack. Each movement seems to promote what appears to be a
particular political program-Law and Economics, the conservatism of so-called laissez-faire;
rights theory, the liberalism of the Warren Court. Thus, neither movement sounds very
convincing when it suggests that all it is "really" up to is attempting to construct a nonpolitical
approach to judicial decision making. See, e.g., Gabel, Book Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 302
(1977) (reviewing R. DWORKIN, supra note 62); Kelman, Misunderstanding Social Life: A
Critique of the Core Premises of Law and Economics, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 274 (1983).
64. For a thoughtful account of this predicament, see Boyle, The Politics of Reason:
Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 769-73 (1985).
65. W. TWINING, supra note 9, at 382 (emphasis added).
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II. THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
A. CLS Explained: The Indeterminacy Argument Reinvigorated
Where does Critical Legal Studies fit in all of this? Like Legal
Realism, CLS combines a progressive political critique with a skepti-
cal jurisprudence.66 The political critique espouses the view that our
society and its institutions fall dramatically short of our democratic
and egalitarian ideals. 67 The skeptical jurisprudence forthrightly
embraces the indeterminacy argument and rejects the claim that the
reasoning judges use to justify the results they reach can, in fact, com-
pel those results. Indeed, like Realism, CLS views the political cri-
tique and the skeptical jurisprudence as closely connected. The false
claim that judging is "objective" or "neutral" obscures the fact that,
as a matter of legal reasoning, most legal decisions could have just as
well come out "the other way," and thereby conceals the removal of
many important social choices from the realm of democratic
decisionmaking.
The skeptical jurisprudence thus goes well beyond the version of
the indeterminacy argument that everyone professes to accept
today-the argument that legal rules do not, of themselves, decide
cases. It is a broader claim that draws on the strand of the Legal
Realist critique that rejects altogether the possibility of "neutral"
judicial decisionmaking.68 It holds that the idealized view of the
judge as a mechanical law-applier-and of law as apolitical-is funda-
mentally and inescapably flawed, because of the very nature of legal
discourse and its connection to human experience and interaction.
1. THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION
Let us return briefly to two of the hypotheticals that I discussed
earlier and examine a common thread that runs through the disputes
presented in each of them. In the "whistleblower" case, the "law"
that the judge was to apply was the command of the legislature, a
statute limiting the employment-at-will rule. Recall that the dispute
centered upon the intention to be attributed to the legislature on the
basis of what it had said in and meant by that statute. In the doctor/
patient case, the "law" that the judge was to apply was the "intention
(or not) of the parties" to form a contract. The dispute centered upon
the intention to be attributed to the doctor on the basis of his state-
66. On the political roots of Realism, see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., THE PoI.ITIcs OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 12; R.
UNGER, supra note 12, at 15-42.
68. See Casebeer, supra note 32, at 684-702; White, supra note 20, at 1018-20.
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ments to and relationship with the dying patient.69 What the
hypotheticals (and, indeed, virtually all legal disputes) have in com-
mon, then, is that they present questions of interpretation. In both of
them, the judge must discern the meaning and significance of lan-
guage and other communicative conduct by and among various legal
actors: legislatures, other judges, the citizens and their institutions.
From the idealized perspective, the judge is viewed as an objec-
tive and neutral facilitator, performing this interpretive role; she sim-
ply carries out "the command of the legislature" or "the intention of
the parties." To Critical Legal Studies, however, judicial interpreta-
tion is not and can never be an "objective and neutral" activity. In
attempting to reconstruct the legislature's or parties' intentions, the
judge's own moral values and ideological assumptions inevitably play
a powerful role; the quest for a value-neutral interpretive approach is
thus seen as simply futile.7v Once again, I will not pretend to offer a
definitive demonstration of this point here; another reference to one of
our hypotheticals should provide the gist of the argument.
Recall that the question presented in the doctor/patient case was
whether the judge should require the doctor to come to the aid of the
dying patient. On the one hand, the judge deciding the case is
presented with the fact that the doctor had never expressly promised
to come to the patient's aid, thus suggesting that no such commitment
could be fairly inferred. On the other hand, the fact that the doctor
had served as the patient's "family physician" suggests that such a
commitment was implicit in the broader context of the parties' rela-
tionship. But how is the judge to evaluate these facts and their con-
flicting implications? The law doesn't tell her, and the facts
themselves point both ways.
At its core, the doctor/patient case-like all legal disputes-
presents a conflict between opposing values or interests. The interests
here are the right of the doctor to be free of the patient's demands on
69. The third hypothetical-the search-and-seizure case-is a variation on the doctor/
patient example. Thus, the Constitution has been read to permit warrantless searches if the
targeted citizen voluntarily consents (see supra note 47), and the dispute presented in that
hypothetical centered upon the intention to be attributed to the citizen on the basis of his
statements and conduct, and their context.
70. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 52, at 698-708; Jaff, supra note 13; Kelman, Interpretive
Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981). For an eloquent
and wonderfully accessible account of the connections between this argument and modern
theories of literary criticism, see Frug, Henry James, Lee Marvin and the Law, N.Y. Times
Book Review, Feb. 16, 1986, § 7, at 1, 29. For more thoroughgoing studies of how such
theories relate to legal problems generally, see Boyle, supra note 64; Gudridge. The Persistence
of Classical Style, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 663 (1983); Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 127 (1984). On the Realist roots of this argument, see Casebeer, supra note 32, at 684-
702; White, supra note 20, at 1018-20.
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the doctor's life, and the right of the patient to rely on the doctor's
services.7 Consciously or unconsciously, the judge will have to
decide which of these values is more important. To be sure, the facts
will have an influence on the values the judge will impose, but the
judge's values will also have an impact on how she reads the facts.
Thus, the absence of an express promise on the part of the doctor
may loom large in the mind of the judge who is more inclined to
protect the doctor's freedom (and accordingly to undertake an espe-
cially searching inquiry in order to ascertain the presence or absence
of consent). Conversely, the fact that the doctor was the "family phy-
sician" may predominate in the analysis of the judge who is more
inclined to protect the patient's reliance (and accordingly to under-
take an especially searching inquiry in order to ascertain the under-
standings and expectations that might have arisen out of that
relationship). One may not claim that either of these interpretative
approaches is "better" or more faithful to what "really happened"
than the other; in the end, they simply reflect different assumptions
about whether, and to what extent, we should protect the the doctor's
freedom versus the patient's reliance.
In sum, then, interpretation is not a "neutral" or "apolitical"
task. Whenever the judge is called upon to construe the meaning of a
"text"-be it a legislative command in the form of a statute, a judicial
one in the form of a precedent, or a "private" agreement between
citizens-she will invariably have to make a value judgment about the
merits of the dispute that brings the parties to court. The only ques-
tion is whether she will do so consciously and openly.
2. THE POLITICS OF LAW
To CLS, there is a second difficulty-apart from the problem of
interpretation-with the image of law as "neutral" and "apolitical."
In a nutshell, it is this: what we think of as "natural" forms of human
association are often simply a reflection of unexamined social conven-
tions or constructs that are, in turn, embodied in and reinforced by
the law. The classic example of this phenomenon can be found in the
tradition of legal analysis that treats the initial distribution of legal
entitlements ("property rights") as a "private" law issue, more or less
immune from "public" (legislative) interference, and thus obscures
the fact that various institutional arrangements could be open to dem-
ocratic revision or reform.72
71. Indeed, the conflict between freedom and reliance underlies many aspects of contract
law. See Kennedy, supra note 19; see also G. GII.MORE, supra note 20.
72. See, e.g., Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence-A First Step by Way of the
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Bear with me, if you will, through one more hypothetical. Near
the beginning of my course on labor law, I engage my students in the
following dialogue: Picture an employee who works for a company
that produces widgets. One working day, this employee builds four
widgets and, at the end of that day, tenders to her boss an amount in
cash equal to the cost of the necessary materials and their procure-
ment, the reasonable rental value of her workspace and tools, and the
apportioned cost of other managerial expenses. She then leaves the
shop and takes the widgets with her, planning to sell them and keep
the profit. What, I ask, will happen?
My students stir restlessly until someone volunteers that the
employer will sue the employee, or have her arrested. On what theo-
ries, I respond. Someone hazards the guess that the employee has
committed the tort of conversion or the crime of theft. I then ask why
the employer is not guilty of the same misconduct when he pays the
employee a reasonable "rent" for her labor, keeps the widgets for
himself, and sells them for his own profit. There is more stirring and
murmuring, until someone finally says, "Because the widgets belong
to the employer-the law says that they're his property."
Why should that be, I ask. After all, there is nothing "neces-
sary" about permitting the employer to "rent" the worker and keep
the widgets; why not structure the relationship the other way around?
When someone objects that, if we did that, "then we wouldn't have
capitalism," I reply that that's exactly my point. The law reflects and
enforces a core assumption about the relationship between employer
and employee in a market economy: the employee's legally protected
interest in the job is limited to his wage, while the employer is
accorded the exclusive right to both the widgets and the profits to be
earned from their sale.73
Public-Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379 (1983); Kennedy,
The Political Significance of the Structure of the Law School Curriculum, 14 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1 (1983); A Symposium: The Public/Private. Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
73. At this point in the dialogue, someone will often object that the law's decision as to
who gets the widget may not be an expression of any substantive policy preference at all;
rather, he will observe, the law may simply be attempting to facilitate the parties' reasonable
expectations with respect to the terms of their contractual exchange. And neither the
employer nor the employee would have ever dreamed that the widgets would, at the end of the
working day, belong to anyone but the employer.
The difficulty with this argument is that it is inevitably circular. "Private" contractual
exchange can only take place against a background distribution of legal entitlements,
determined and enforced by the state, that tells you what's yours and tells me what's mine to
keep or exchange. See, e.g., Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 CoLUM. L.
RiEv. 603 (1943). The terms of any exchange-and hence the parties' expectations with
respect thereto-will depend upon what the law says that each of the parties has to give (sell)
to the other in the first place. Accordingly, one cannot point to the "parties' expectations" in
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To CLS, the decision to give legal sanction to (and hence to
enforce by state coercion) this or any distribution of legal entitlements
reflects assumptions that should not be immune to re-examination
and critique. We might want to consider the current arrangement in
light of our democratic and egalitarian aspirations and ask whether it
exacts too great a cost in terms of the self-determination and the bar-
gaining power of working people. Or we might conclude that
employer ownership provides advantages in terms of investment
incentives and transaction efficiencies, and therefore decide that we
prefer to leave things the way they are. The point is that the current
distribution is a choice-not a "natural" or "necessary" phenomenon.
It only seems "natural" because of our habit of treating the initial
distribution of legal entitlements as a "private" law issue, which
obscures the fact that this arrangement is wholly a matter of political
choice. A major aim of CLS, then, is to open up such subjects to
democratic examination and debate.
3. SQUARING THE CIRCLE: INDETERMINACY, PREDICTABILITY,
AND LEGAL REASONING
The foregoing arguments often prompt two related questions.
The first challenges CLS with an insight drawn from the actual expe-
rience of legal practice: if legal reasoning is so "indeterminate," how
is it that competent lawyers are usually able to give their clients sound
advice? The second question points to an apparent tension within the
arguments CLS makes: if legal reasoning is so "indeterminate," how
can the movement contend that the law ever reflects a particular set of
political choices or assumptions in any systematic way?
Such questions reflect, among other things, a misunderstanding
of the nature of the indeterminacy argument that CLS embraces.7 4
order to justify the initial placement of the legal entitlement, because that placement will
ultimately determine their expectations.
The background distribution of legal entitlements also shapes the parties' expectations
with respect to what they can gain from a contractual exchange. To use our widget example, if
the employer is given the initial right to the widget, the employee may not be willing to pay
more than the "wage" to obtain it. If the employee is given that right, however, she may not
be willing to accept anything less than its full market price to give it up. Accordingly, not only
does the initial placement of the entitlement determine who pays whom for the widget, but it
may also greatly affect the parties' beliefs regarding the price at which they would be willing to
exchange it. See Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. CAl.. L. Ri-v. 669 (1979); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement
Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401-29 (1981) ("The Offer-Asking Problem").
74. To be fair, however, the second question points to a tension evident within the
movement itself. Thus, there are at least two discernible strands of Critical Legal Theory. See
R. UNGER, supra note 12, at 121-22. On the one hand, there are CLS scholars who stress the
indeterminacy-and hence the incoherence-of law. See, e.g.. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L.
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That argument simply holds that legal outcomes are not constrained
by legal reasoning, because legal reasoning can virtually always justify
contradictory results in a given case." It does not mean, however,
that judicial decisionmaking is altogether arbitrary. Judicial choices
are, in fact, constrained in significant ways by a variety of phenomena
that make up the professional "culture" within which legal decision-
making takes place. 76 Recall the widget hypothetical from the previ-
ous section. However compelling your legal argument might be that
the employee and not the employer should get the widgets at the end
of the working day, 77 the odds of convincing a judge to buy that out-
come are slight indeed. You would be fighting an uphill battle against
the legal profession's customs and conventions, the judge's "common
sense," her fears of reversal by a higher court or the legislature, her
fears of criticism from the bar and the academic community, and-
given the stratum of society from which our judges are usually
recruited-probably her personal ideological commitments as well.78
Our recognition of (or intuitions about) these psychological, sociologi-
cal, institutional, and political constraints on the judge's behavior
would lead all but the most naive among us to make the confident and
surely accurate prediction that the judge would reject the employee's
claim, even if we were to acknowledge that the legal arguments at
issue are in equipoise. The point, then, is that constraints of this sort
account for our experience that law is predictable-to the extent that
it is predictable.79
REV. 293 (1984). On the other hand, there are those scholars who mine various areas of legal
doctrine and attempt to uncover coherent value structures within them. See, e.g., J. ATLESON,
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983). For an insightful and
provocative analysis of the conflicts and connections between and within these differing
approaches, see Boyle, supra note 64.
75. See, e.g., R. UNGER, supra note 12, at 8-11; Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism
and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 9-19 (1984); Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68
MINN. L. REV. 473 (1984).
76. The most thoughtful and thoroughgoing account of this point is offered in Singer,
supra note 75, at 19-25:
[The indeterminacy argument] does not mean . . . that outcomes in our legal
system are completely unpredictable or that the choices made by judges are
arbitrary in the sense that they are unconsidered. Considered choices can be
described and even predicted to some extent because they are conditioned by
legal culture, conventions, "common sense," and politics. Custom, rather than
reason, narrows the choices and suggests the result.
Id. at 24-25; see also Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STrAN. L. REV. 57, 124-25 (1984).
77. For arguments to this effect that are quite persuasive as a matter of "legal reasoning,"
see Singer, supra note 75, at 22-23, and Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 Micti. L. REV. 694, 697-705
(1980).
78. See Singer, supra note 75, at 19-25.
79. Forecasting judicial behavior is seldom as easy as it seems to be in the widget example;
most cases that are worth litigating are much "closer," in terms of the various constraints
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One of the more significant of the "cultural" constraints on judi-
cial choice may lie in the structure of legal argument and reasoning
itself. If legal arguments can't decide cases, they may nevertheless
have a powerful impact on the way we think about (or, more impor-
tantly, don't think about) legal disputes.80 As the previous section
suggested, our "instinct" that the employer's ownership of the widget
is implicit in the "natural" order of things-a matter of just plain
''common sense"-is an instinct that is in part created and reinforced
by a tradition of legal argument in which virtually all lawyers, judges,
and legal academics in this society are trained. Accordingly, we sim-
ply don't think of different employer/employee arrangements as plau-
sible (let alone likely); indeed, we usually don't think about the
possibility of other arrangements at all.
In sum, then, CLS rejects the view-wrongly attributed to the
Legal Realists as well-that judicial decisionmaking is altogether
unconstrained, that judges decide cases on the basis of "what they had
for breakfast." It holds instead that legal reasoning forms an impor-
tant part of the professional "culture" that shapes judicial decision-
making in ways that are often not self-evident. Much of the
theoretical work of the movement attempts to explore various mani-
festations of this phenomenon and to examine the underlying moral
values and ideological assumptions that are thus revealed.
B. CLS Defended: So Are You Guys Commies, or What?
What, then, are we to make of the terrible things being said about
CLS? Are the movement's adherents-as The Wall Street Journal
contends-"Marxist/Anarchist[s]" who believe that law is "merely a
tool for the rich"? 8' Not by a long shot. Most of us no more believe
that economic power "determines" the law than we believe that legal
reasoning determines it; indeed, a rejection of such vulgar Marxist
determinism is a major contribution of CLS scholarship to progressive
legal thought.8 2
operating on the judge, than the question whether the employer or the employee should get the
widget.
80. See, e.g., Gabel, supra note 63, at 313 n.18; Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in
Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1358 (1982); Singer, supra note 75, at 21.
81. The Veritas About Harvard, supra note 1, at 26, col. 1.
82. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 64, at 721-30, 762-69; Gordon, New Developments in Legal
Theory, in THE POLITICS oi: LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRIrIQuE, supra note 12, at 281. Many of
us do work in an intellectual tradition in which Marx plays an important role; indeed, his core
insight that human belief systems are social constructs is the starting point for much modern
social theory. But that hardly makes us Marxists. Indeed, to the extent that that reckless
charge suggests that we favor totalitarianism and/or thought control, it describes a set of
ideological commitments that are the polar opposite of those held by CLS.
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Would we "toppl[e]" the law "forthwith"? 3 Hardly. However
indeterminate it is-however much we may think that it conceals the
removal of important social issues from the arena of democratic
choice-many of us would readily agree with the sentiments elo-
quently expressed by the British historian E.P. Thompson:
[T]he rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon
power and the defense of the citizen from power's all-intrusive
claims, seems to me to be an unqualified human good. To deny or
belittle this good is, in this dangerous century when the resources
and pretensions of power continue to enlarge, a desperate error of
intellectual abstraction. More than this, it is a self-fulfilling error,
which encourages us to give up the struggle against bad laws and
class-bound procedures, and to disarm ourselves before power. It
is to throw away a whole inheritance of struggle about law, and
within the forms of law, whose continuity can never be fractured
without bringing men and women into immediate danger.8 4
Moreover, we recognize that our legal tradition embodies a rich tex-
ture of conflicting values and aspirations-"good and bad,
emancipatory and oppressive."8 5 Indeed, in one of the most ambitious
constructive projects undertaken by a CLS scholar, Roberto Unger
has sketched a future that explicitly and extensively draws on the
"constraints on power" and the "emancipatory" kernels contained in
current legal doctrine.
8 6
Then why all the fuss? Why do our detractors say the things
they do? One reason, I think, is ignorance: some of our critics simply
do not know what they are talking about.87 To be sure, the situation
is in part one of our own making; as I mentioned at the outset, CLS
scholarship can be terribly rough-going and thus easily
misunderstood.
A second reason for the passionate denunciations is institutional
politics. As legal education passes from the hands of one generation
of scholars to those of another, there are bound to be some painful
83. The Veritas About Harvard, supra note 1, at 26, col. 1.
84. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266
(1975); see Forbath, Taking Lefts Seriously (Book Review), 92 YALE L.J. 1041, 1050 n.40
(1983) (reviewing THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 12);
Gordon, supra note 76, at 95 n.88; Kennedy, supra note 19, at 1720 n.82; Klare, supra note 80,
at 1358 n.1; Note, Public Policy, supra note 37, at 1951 n.127.
85. Forbath, supra note 84, at 1051; see also Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-
Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1563, 1597 & n.43
(1984); Kennedy, Critical Labor Law Theory: A Comment, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 503, 506
(1981).
86. R. UNGER, supra note 12.
87. Compare Carrington, supra note 6, at 227 & n.21 with R. UNGER, supra note 12.
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and difficult moments; Red-baiting is a crude but not altogether inef-
fective means on the part of some to resist the transition.88 Once
more, however, we are not without fault; when we toss around
macho-sounding expressions like "trashing" and "deconstruction,"
we are more likely to alienate our elders than to engage them in a
serious and mutually respectful debate.
In the end, however, I think that the primary impulse for the
opposition comes from the same source as did the hostile reaction to
the Legal Realists: an honest and legitimate fear of the implications
of the indeterminacy argument taken seriously. Part of this, of
course, stems from a genuine concern about defending the judicial
role in a democratic society, but I think that it ultimately runs much
deeper than that. If law and politics cannot be separated-if lawyer,
judge, and law professor cannot claim that they are "just doing their
jobs" when they make a legal argument or accept one-then legal
actors must be ready to accept personal responsibility for the part
they play in the legal system and society at large. Given the amount
of power that those in our profession wield, this is indeed a frighten-
ing prospect.
But the alternative is to deny that we are exercising power over
other people's lives even while continuing to do so. It seems to me
that the greatest danger of that denial is not that those whose lives we
affect will believe it; they won't for a minute.89 Rather, the danger is
that we might believe it and thus continue to avoid the self-knowledge
that is indispensible to responsibility.90
88. Recall the sage dictum that academic politics are especially bitter because the stakes
are so low. See generally War Between Professors Pervades Harvard Law, Wash. Post, Dec. 21,
1985, § A, at 3.
89. See J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY 146-83 (1983).
90. See Kennedy, How the Law School Fails. A Polemic, I YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION
71, 74 (1970).
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